June 1, 2020—Private Equity Firm Silver Lake Takes Stake in Third Point’s Blank Check Company to Push Through Global Blue AG Acquisition. What Makes this a Contender for Deal of the Year?

Hertz Files for Bankruptcy as Recession Hits Used Car Values. What Happens to the Rental Car Company Now?

Newspaper Company Torstar Sold to Investor Group at a Negative Value. Why Should Shareholders Support the Deal?

Alpha + Beta: A Discussion on Recent Performance of the Investment Strategy.

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Welcome investors to the Absolute Return Podcast. Your source for stock market analysis, global macro musings and hedge fund investment strategies. Your hosts Julian Klymochko and Michael Kesslering aim to bring you the knowledge and analysis you need to become a more intelligent and wealthier investor. This episode is brought to you by accelerate financial technologies. Accelerate because performance matters. Find out more at www.Accelerateshares.Com.

Julian Klymochko: Welcome podcast listeners to episode 70 of The Absolute Return Podcast. I am your host, Julian Klymochko. 

Michael Kesslering: And I Mike Kesslering. 

Julian Klymochko: Today is a lovely Friday, May 29, 2020. It is the end of the month for equity investors, obviously a good month for various asset classes. We are really seeing quite the rebound in risk assets ever since the big market crash in March, led by the Coronavirus. It is great to see a nice recovery there, not just in the markets but in society as well. We are certainly seeing a flattening of the curve and a great reopening, so hopefully that momentum can continue as we go into June here. A couple really cool things happening in the week that we wanted to discuss today. 

    • Specifically this deal that Silver Lake did, I’m nominating it for potential deal of the year. What happened here was private equity firms, Silver Lake; they took a stake in Third Point’s Blank Check Company to push through the Global Blue AG acquisition. What makes this a contender for dealer of the year? We are going to chat about. 
    • HERTZ the rental car company filed for bankruptcy as the recession hits used car values. What happened or what is going to happen to the rental company now? Are they going to liquidate? Are they going to restructure?
    • Really, really interesting M&A deal here. Newspaper company Torstar, they sold to an investor group at a negative value. That is right. They sold it for less than the cash on its balance sheet. Something you do not see every day. Why should shareholders support a deal at a negative value?
    • Lastly, we are going to touch on alpha plus beta, a discussion on recent performance of this new investment strategy.


Julian Klymochko: But first let’s chat about the Silver Lake deal, which I deemed just an absolute master stroke. Every now and then a business strategy comes along and it’s just mind blowing on how clever it is and you just got to be in awe of it and that’s certainly happening right now with this Far Point Silver Lake deal, which we’re going to get into.

What happened here? I am going to talk specifics that private equity firms, Silver Lake, took an activist stake in hedge fund Third Point’s, special purpose acquisition company Far Point. Far Point is a SPAC, a special purpose acquisition company backed by Dan Loeb’s hedge fund Third Point. Now this SPAC it IPOed…I am going to get the numbers right here and in our models. It IPO in June of 2018 did, did an IPO for about $630 million and certainly one of the larger special purpose acquisition companies. And they struck a deal earlier this year with Global Blue AG, which is a Fintech firm. Now this deal was struck pre Coronavirus. Now what happened after given the downturn in Global Blue Business due to COVID-19? Far Point, board of directors took the unprecedented action of recommending its shareholders vote against the deal that they previously put together.

You had this board of directors put together this deal, say go to shareholders, Hey, we’ve got this great deal, let’s do it. Let’s vote for it. Then a couple months later they are saying, wait, hold on, hold on. Now we are recommending vote against the deal. Which was just crazy unprecedented. But certainly with COVID-19 we are living through unprecedented times and you got to know why this is so important and what makes us a deal that Silver Lake the strategy so, so interesting is that Silver Lake is a controlling shareholder of Global Blue. This SPAC Far Point’s acquisition of Global Blue served as Silver Lake’s exit plan. When Far Point board came out against the deal that put Silver Lake exit in potential jeopardy. What Silver Lake did after that was just an absolute master stroke. What they did was they went and spent a hundred million dollars to acquire a 12% stake in Far Point the acquirer of their portfolio company Global Blue with the goal of voting their shares for the deal and getting this Global Blue deal, this acquisition by Far Point over the finish line. Because once again, Silver Lake is Global Blue largest shareholders and is keen to exit the investment at what is looking at now like at quite the inflated price given, you know, the steep downturn in Global Blue business and likely subsequent steep decline in their value. However, when Far Point struck this deal prior to coronavirus hitting, they obviously are going to value Global Blue on a normalized basis and not really adjusted for this deep decline in its business ever since Coronavirus hit. Now, what is really unique about this transaction, and this is just speculation on my part. But if you look at how SPAC work is they allow investors to vote for the acquisition and at the same time redeem their shares for the net asset value of the cash within the SPEC. What Silver Lake could do here is they bought a hundred million dollar stake, 12% of this Far Point SPAC at a discount to the underlying SPAC, cash vote for the deal.

Then they could go ahead and redeem their money, make money on their SPAC investment, get the deal done, get the Global Blue deal done, i.e. acquired by Far Point, which presents a partial exit for Silver Lake. And then at the end of the day, Silver Point or Silver Lake on both sides of the transactions. They would be winning, they could be winning on the Global Blue sale in which they are the controlling shareholder and they would be winning on their Far Point stake by buying at a discount, voting for the deal, and then redeeming and making a profit there. In my opinion, from Silver Lake perspective, this is a heads they win tails, they still win proposition and it is just absolutely genius. This deal, the Far Point vote requires 50.1% of shareholders to vote for and therefore Silver Lake has 12% and Third Point, the Dan Loeb hedge fund has a big stake and when they set up Far Point, they basically had to guarantee that they would vote for any deal.

They are really stuck here and I am sure they are absolutely livid about that. Including Third Point, 25% stake, they got 37% support, and if we look at how SPACs generally function these things if you look at the shareholder list, they are loaded to the gills with hedge funds. These are favourite of hedge funds. You know, and we run this strategy and our accelerate arbitrage fund where you buy SPAC units, you get shares and you get warrants. And when it comes to the deal, if it’s trading above, if the price is trading above NAV, you sell into the market prior to the vote. Or if it’s not, you redeem however you vote for the deal and hold onto your warrants. Because those could add value. If you vote against the deal, there is really no incentive because then your warrants are automatically worthless. If you vote for the deal, redeem and hold onto the warrants, and then you get that additional value for their warrants.

I think Third Point’s is really stuck here. They are in a tough situation and I believe that they even need to invest additional capital in this. According to Far Point prospectus. I believe there is some sort of forward agreement for an additional investment, which obviously they are not happy about because given the decline of Global Blue value, I would not be surprised at Far Point after this. If this deal goes through afterwards, it could trade down from $10 to say $4 and Third Point’s sitting on, you know, a nine figure loss in value overnight. Certainly, Third Point’s a big loser here. Silver Point, a huge winner, and just a masterful strategic business moved by them on this Far Point SPAC, a Global Blue deal. What are your thoughts on it? I am just taking notes and learning lessons on just a master class here from Silver Lake.

Michael Kesslering: Yeah, it certainly is and they have been quite, quite active during this pandemic. We have talked about some of their other investments through the pandemic before here.

Julian Klymochko: They are like the Berkshire of 2008. Warren has been out and Silver Lake is in. 

Michael Kesslering: Yeah, absolutely. You did mention the fact that Third Point, they still have to invest additional capital into this deal. How this deal was originally going to work when they announced it is that effectively there would be about just about $950 million being taken out of the company. There would be $650 million of cash on the balance sheet of FPac of this back of this SPAC. That cash as well as an additional investment from outside investors, which would hundred million dollars of Third Point themselves. In this deal that they now are not very keen on, they have to put a fresh injection of another a hundred million dollars

Julian Klymochko: At $10 per share, and if you look at how bad this thing’s going to trade after, where do you think it’s going to trade? Instantly? $4 the day after the vote goes through. 

Michael Kesslering: Yeah, it’s got to trade lower than $10, that’s for sure. I don’t know how low it goes, could but it probably going to trade more than $10. But so in that truancy of $350 million, inclusive of the a hundred million from Third Point you have $125 million from Jack Ma and Financial, and so for those familiar with Jack Ma, he’s the founder of Ali Baba. Another big name involved in this deal, but so with that $650 million, you would have $950, which would go to Global Blue shareholders in the form of a cash dividend of sorts. And so that would effectively be Silver Lake getting out of the deal for, you know, getting their money back on original investment, they would still have some exposure. But the one thing is that now with Silver Lake making this announcement. They did have a letter to the board of FPAC and one of the additional things is of that capital that they are able to take as a cash dividend. They said that they would convert to $168 million of that into equity to help with liquidity with the pro forma company as this company does need liquidity to get through the crisis. 

As well, one other thing that they mentioned, and this is really, where it’s kind of centred around in terms of really trying to get these investors, as you had mentioned, a bunch of hedge funds, so likely going to vote yes anyway. Another carrot that they kind of hung in front of investors was they said that they would discuss ways to target over a dollar per warrant value. And as our listeners are familiar, when you buy a SPAC and IPO, you get the common share and a warrant. In this case, it’s a third of a warrant per share, and that will be in the form of a unit. Right now, those warrants are trading at about 68 cents. They are talking about ways that they can that warrant value to get over a dollar. Because the cash and trust, the common share value is kind of locked in for if you’re wanting to redeem, it’s really, you’re going to get kind of, you’re going to get NAV because this deal will not trade above NAV. I can’t see that anyway, but so that’s where it’s very interesting, but it all likelihood like nothing’s going to happen with the warrants. They clearly just said that they would discuss ways to target that. I just view that as a kind of hanging the carrot out in front of investors, try to get convinced some default vote yes. 

As well, one other thing they offered was to match share for share every founder share. There are shares that Third Point hold. Every share per share that the founder agrees to convert to an earn out share that they would do the exact same, and, you know, there’s no way that, the founder shares get converted to an earn out share in a deal that they are not very excited about. There is no way that they are going to, you know, increase their exposure to the potential upside of this transaction. I just thought this was another interesting addition where it is like there is no way that that Third Point and the founding team is interested in earn-out shares on the deal that they are not even interested in, as you had mentioned, this was very, very smart of Silver Lake. This is just a really good deal for them. That says nothing about the ability of Global Blue to turn things around. I really have no insight into that, but it is really just Silver Lake making the best out of you know, a potentially bad situation and yeah, just very interesting to watch here.

Julian Klymochko: Yeah, beautifully done by Silver Lake. As I stated heads, they win. Tails, they still win so genius strategy. Investors should study what they are doing here. Follow Silver Lake cause they are very, very smart investors. 


Julian Klymochko: On the next file. Some restructuring, so after years of strategic blunders, a hundred two-year-old rental Car Company, Hertz finally succumb to its massive debt load and filed for bankruptcy a week ago. Now the company’s long-term decline. It really wasn’t Coronavirus like certainly that pushed it over the edge, but Hertz was really in long-term decline. It stemmed from its debt fuelled overpriced acquisition of Dollar Thrifty in 2012. They are forced into a competitive bidding environment, had to bid more than they wanted to. They loaded up with debt there, and even before that, if we rewind all the way back to 2005, it actually went through a leveraged buyout, I believe by CD&R.

We all know that a private equity LBO loads a company with that. They subsequently went public again after that. So certainly, they have had a weak balance sheet for a very, very long time. Then combined with market share losses to ride sharing companies like Uber and Lyft. Then in addition to that, dramatic recent downturn in travel due to the Coronavirus just made its business unsustainable. Hertz at $19 billion in debt, largely consisting of auto backed securities, and so they have a massive rental fleet and they finance that through by putting them into asset back securities. The really interesting aspect of why they had to file for bankruptcy. The coronavirus led economic downturn has caused used vehicle prices to decline markedly. Now this effectively caused a margin call for Hertz that it could not meet, so it’s undoing in the end was dependent on financial engineering through asset backed security.

In April, they faced a roughly half a billion dollar payment to ABS bondholders. The lenders that finance their fleet, Hertz had to pay them more money because their obligations, their liabilities ballooned as used car values dropped. It was really this dynamic of a margin call because the security backing these loans, these bonds are their vehicle fleet, and the value of that fleet declined dramatically just given the recession here. Hertz had about 1 billion in cash on his book to make this $500 million payment. Instead, you know the board faced a choice here, pay that or preserve cash. They chose to preserve cash, file for creditor protection. Got a statement here from the Hertz CEO Paul Stone. He stated, “with the severity of the COVID-19 impact on our business and the uncertainty of when travel and the economy will rebound. We need to take further steps to weather a potentially prolonged recovery.” The other really interesting aspect, one of our favourite investors, uncle Carl Icahn, he was the largest shareholder in the Hertz global. He unloaded his entire stake in the rental car company at a significant loss days after it filed for bankruptcy protection. Estimated that he lost a good chunk of change, about 1.5 billion, which would hurt what in it? I guess that was a pretty good pun. Hurt-Hertz. I am here all night. 

Michael Kesslering: No, absolutely. That it is a terrible situation. I mean Icahn; he entered in 2014 held at 39% stake. Yeah, like even as of February, it was a $20 stock and closed Friday at a dollar. I believe he sold his block at 72 cents. One thing that does, that is indicative of, is the cost for liquidity when you do have such a large block. I think sometimes investors forget that, you know, it is not as easy as just, you know, clicking sell in your brokerage account when you own a large block of shares and a company like that. But as well, I mean, this deal kind of has everything. In any bankruptcy situation, it is always easy to look at one issue and you know. What the media has been focused on the Coronavirus and the impact that has had on their business, but really it is just the culmination of a lot of strategic decisions and, you know, mistakes that they’ve made.

You had mentioned the securitization basically of their fleet but as well the bidding war that they had for, Dollar Thrifty back in 2010, they originally tried to buy them for $1.2 billion dollars and ended up buying them $2.6 billion a couple years later after a bidding war with Avis. And really that was kind of their start of their shift to diversify out of their core market of the business traveller segment, and into that leisure travel segment. And then you combine, you know a decision to go into effectively a new market with poor execution where initially when they announced the deal, they were expecting synergies to the tune of around a $100 million dollars, where in the first year they saw extra costs, so not synergies. Extra costs of $70 million dollars, And so, you know, when you combine that with just the poor execution as well as the securitization. I would like to note on the asset backed security, that discussion, especially with their fleet. Is that one option for creditors is to liquidate the assets of the company. And in that case they would be liquidating the fleet but it really wouldn’t make sense them to do so, and you know, the creditors have shown no signs of wanting to do that. It looks like it’s just going to be a debt restructuring and the company will continue operations. But if that did happen…I was reading online, there is a little bit of concern about the used car market and the reverberations of that.

Julian Klymochko: Because you would have a massive flood in supply, and so, you know, what is the true value of their fleet? It would be significantly less if they were liquidating the whole thing.

Michael Kesslering: Absolutely, and it would just be a huge destruction of value. I think any concerns around that are not really valid at this point in time. Certainly, that overhang can impact the price of used cars, but I don’t think that they’re going to be trying to liquidate those any anytime soon at least. But overall, it’s an interesting story. As you look at the economy and you know, there is multiple industries that are in distress right now such as, you have the airlines, you have the cruise ship industry and you know, the common refrain is that these industries and as well as the rental car market and all three of those industries I believe will survive. It is just a matter of who owns the equity, as you know, that is a common refrain you hear from investors, is that ultimately these industries will be around, so why not buy the dip and why you want to, you know, get away from that logic is that equity holders can still get wiped out and the company itself survives. It is just that the creditors take over. It is a matter of different ownership, so Hertz itself will survive, but you as equity holder can get wiped out. That is just something to remember with, many of these situations that I thought that I would bring up.

Julian Klymochko: Yeah, Mike, that is a really good point because I see obviously on the service Robinhood, which is very popular with unsophisticated retail investors, you see them being very attracted to equities of bankrupt companies. Where the amount of accounts holding the stock just kind of skyrockets. We saw that on whiting petroleum, which is looking like a near zero for the stock. And right now I just checked and, and Hertz has about 60,000 Robinhood accounts that own it and such, just a warning to investors to understand the restructuring process. And if you’re not a restructuring expert, you don’t understand the plan of reorganization, then it likely doesn’t make sense to be participating in chapter 11 reorganizations and things of that nature. If you are, not an expert there and you know, if you are trying to buy a dip on a bankrupt equity, that is likely, not a good idea.

Michael Kesslering: Especially when you mentioned the bankrupt, like being an expert and whatnot, is that because the amount of volatility on a company that is going through chapter 11 is substantial. Like we had just mentioned Carl Icahn sold out for 72 cents on Tuesday. The stocks at a dollar. There is quite a bit of volatility there, and you could end up getting in a situation where you are kind of out of your element.  A lot of caution is probably necessary. 


Julian Klymochko: Here is, something that you don’t see every day. A buyout at a negative enterprise value, that is right. Publicly traded newspaper company Torstar. They’re getting acquired for negative 18 million, that’s right. They are effectively paying the buyer 18 million bucks to take it off public shareholders hands. Explaining this, how this works. The 52 million price tag for Torstar market cap, i.e. the payment to equity holders. Now what Torstar is the owner of the Toronto Star and a portfolio of other news outlets, this $52 million price tag is actually less than the net cash on its balance sheet, which is roughly $70 million dollars. That is where you get the negative $18 million dollar price tag for this business. The buyer here, the buyer of the largest and oldest newspaper chain in Canada being bought by Northstar Capital LP. An investment firm run by a businessman Paul Rivett who used to be involved in Prem Watson Fairfax and Jordan Bitove who I believe his dad brought the Toronto Raptors to Canada and you know, a seasoned entrepreneur, very successful business man.

However, on this buyout, it is less than the company’s cash and shareholders. Even if you think of it from the perspective of a shareholder, why wouldn’t the board just liquidate the company? There has certainly be much better off liquidating the business, shutting it down, distributing the cash. Not only do they have cash on the balance sheet, but they also have $103 million in investments. I looked at the balance sheet, so they got a 56% equity investment and VerticalScope, nearly 20% ownership and Black Press, 15% equity interest in Blue Ant Media, a 33% interest in Canadian Press Enterprises and nearly 22% interest in Robo-Advisor Nest Wealth. They value those investments; I assume that is book value at $103 million bucks. So that’s additional liquidation value for shareholders here, that they’re in fact not getting who’s getting this as Northstar Capital, who can effectively buy the company, liquidate these assets, pay them their money back and more, and then have the Toronto Star and other newspaper assets for less than free.

So pretty sweet deal for them, not so sweet for shareholders, aside from, you know, you look at where the stock was trading, it is a penny stock. They are paying 63% or 63 cents cash per share to shareholders to buy this company. A represented a 57.5% premium to Torstar unaffected market price, so I can see it from the perspective of a board of directors. If someone is willing to buy the stock and a 58% premium, it is really tough to say no, however if you’re on the board of a company and it’s trading at like half of its cash value, you’re doing something wrong. Like clearly the board made a huge error here. The stock was at like 40 cents and it had about 80 cents in cash per share on its balance sheet, aside from probably like a buck, a share of these private investments. Really feel for shareholders, but there is not a lot that they can do given that the families that control the class eight voting shares.

There is a family trust that was established after the long-time publisher Joseph Atkinson actually died in 1948. A number of families hold controlling Class-A voting shares, including Honderich, Hindmarsh, Campbell and Thall families. Clearly old money in this trust, they are wanting to exit, got a strategic rationale from the buyers here. Got a quote here from Paul Rivett, he stated. “Traditional media is under siege, but we believe people will pay for good content. What Torstar has and has had for a hundred years. It is fantastic content. What they don’t have is a platform to deliver it.” So it looks like they’re not going to liquidate the business that they’re going to reinvest or so they say is trying to grow it, but certainly it’s de-risked from the perspective of having, you know, way more value here than what they’re paying for it. Financing being provided by Canso and with respect to, you know potential upside. I mean I believe the lockups and by lockups, shareholders have agreed that to vote in favour of the deal. I believe that they’re soft lockups which would allow them to vote for a superior proposal should it come along, not speculating on one at this point, but certainly wouldn’t be surprised by one just given the odd situation of the board selling a company for less far less than the cash on its balance sheet. What are your thoughts on this? A head scratch of a deal here?

Michael Kesslering: Yeah, just to play a little bit of a devil’s advocate here is, you know, right now as you’d mentioned, you know, the deal is being done for less than the net cash on the balance sheet. And that’s not even taking into account the other private investments that, the company holds as assets. But one thing to consider is, yes. The company does have positive EBITDA right now as well, but you know that has been somewhat of a melting ice cube. 

Julian Klymochko: Certainly. 

Michael Kesslering: Absolutely, and so I haven’t looked into the actual underlying you know, capex requirements, but you know, they very well could have been pushing off capex requirements into the future just to try to remain cash flow positive. Over the last couple of years, and especially if they are trying to make more of a push into digital that does cost some capital. Will cost them some capital, and so that is where it could be a little bit deceiving is on a go forward basis. If there are real capital needs for the company, it becomes, you know, a less good deal for the acquiring parties. One interesting thing too that I did want to point out is the potential for one of the assets on the balance sheet, you know, their investments in nest wealth. Our listeners may be wondering why the Toronto Star would be investing in nest wealth.

Julian Klymochko: A global advice. 

Michael Kesslering: This is just pure speculation, but it very well could just be some sort of advertising agreement where nest was getting advertisements on their platform in exchange for equity, that could be this narrow. We have seen that play out with a few other players in Canada. Ultimately, as well, I would say just to play devil’s advocate as well, for shareholders, I mean this was a very illiquid stock. It was a penny stock, so it was trading in the 30 to 47 range. And it was trading on average prior to this deal. Where you have a bunch of merger ARBs coming in and it is trading about, you know 4 million shares a day now. It used to be trading about 87,000 shares a day. In terms of a dollar amount, some of this could just be viewed as a very expensive you know, liquidity event, you know, investors in order to get to generate a liquidity event, they’re having to sell at a discount, much like what we just discuss with Carl Icahn selling at 72 cents. Couple of days later, it is trading at a dollar with Hertz this is a liquidity event for investors. And you know, that does cost you something, but overall I would agree that the likelihood that this is a good deal for the acquiring investors for Northstar you know, that’s a pretty high probability. 

Julian Klymochko: And with respect to the merger arbitrage spread trading roughly 7% annualized and in 96% odds of closing.


Julian Klymochko: Lastly, I wanted to touch on alpha plus beta strategy, which we have discussed and posted on our blog prior. Just wanted to touch on kind of a performance over the past year. Before I do that, I wanted to reiterate what exactly is alpha plus beta as an investment strategy? Well, it refers to a strategy that combines index returns beta with a long short multi-factor overlay portfolio alpha. The goal is to really track the index plus get additional returns on top of that from your alpha overlay portfolio. The way that we implement this, it is a hundred percent exposure, and in this case, it is the Canadian index, the TSX 60 plus a 50% exposure to along multifactor overlay and a 50% exposure to the short multifactor overlay. You are effectively overweighting are going extra-long stocks, you believe will outperform or you are underweighting are going net short stocks, you believe will underperform.

Now how did this do over the past year? Well it beat the TSX 60 by 600 basis points. That 6% over the past 12 months, and I wanted to highlight not just that, but the way it did it was with lower volatility. 31.7% standard deviation versus 32.3% for the benchmark and lower draw down. It had alpha plus beta had a 37.5% max drawdown versus nearly 40% for the index. Some disclosure here, so we do run an alpha plus beta strategy as an alternative ETF. The ticker is ATSX on the Toronto stock exchange over the past year. Alpha plus beta had downside capture of just 85% versus obviously the benchmark at a hundred percent. That is really kind of the crux of this outperformance. Alpha plus beta does have short positions, which help cushion the downside in big drawdowns, which we certainly had in Q1.

And where those short positions help, that alpha overlay really helped cushion the downside and that leads to or has led to outperformance over the past year. I really wanted to just inform investors of that and the posts that I put out this week, it stated the combination of alpha plus betas ability or its ability to perform and its track record of outperformance in addition to its risk mitigation effects while tracking the index reasonably well. And the point of tracking the index is such that investors stick with it over the long term. It really makes an allocation to alpha plus beta, a compelling proposition, but that is about it for us. On this week’s Absolute Return Podcast. Chatted about potentially deal of the year, interesting negative enterprise value M&A and a cool reorganization bankruptcy situation along with alpha plus beta, how that is performing. We hope you enjoyed the episode. If you would like to check out more, you can look at absolutereturnpodcast.com please give us a rating on Apple podcast. Tune in next week. Follow us on Twitter as well; my handle is @Julian Klymochko, K-L-Y-M-O-C-H-K-O, and Mike your handle is? 

Michael Kesslering: It is M_Kesslering. That is K-E-S-S-L-E-R-I-N-G. 

Julian Klymochko: All right, folks wish you all the best in your trading, investing and speculating, and until we chat next week. Hope you have a good one. Cheers.

Thanks for tuning in to the Absolute Return Podcast. This episode was brought to you by Accelerate Financial Technologies. Accelerate, because performance matters. Find out more at www.AccelerateShares.com. The views expressed in this podcast to the personal views of the participants and do not reflect the views of Accelerate. No aspect of this podcast constitutes investment legal or tax advice. Opinions expressed in this podcast should not be viewed as a recommendation or solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any securities or investment strategies. The information and opinions in this podcast are based on current market conditions and may fluctuate and change in the future. No representation or warranty expressed or implied is made on behalf of Accelerate as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this podcast. Accelerate does not accept any liability for any direct indirect or consequential loss or damage suffered by any person as a result relying on all or any part of this podcast and any liability is expressly disclaimed.