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Absolute Return Podcast #20: Deals Deals Deals! The M&A Episode

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July 2, 2019–Abbvie To Buy Allergan in $83 Billion Pharmaceutical Deal. What’s the Strategic Rationale?

Additional Activist Takes Stake In Hudson’s Bay As Shareholders Continue Push For Higher Price. What Next?

Transat Accepts Friendly $520 Million Takeover From Air Canada. Is it a Done Deal?

Eldorado Resorts To Acquire Caesars Entertainment in $17.3 Billion Deal. Why Did it Happen?

Stocks With a “Hot Hand” – A Discussion of Investing with Operating Momentum

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Transcript

Welcome investors to the Absolute Return Podcast. Your source for stock market analysis, global macro musings and hedge fund investment strategies. Your hosts Julian Klymochko and Michael Kesslering aim to bring you the knowledge and analysis you need to become a more intelligent and wealthier investor. This episode is brought to you by accelerate financial technologies. Accelerate because performance matters. Find out more at www.Accelerateshares.Com.

Julian Klymochko: Welcome investors to Episode 20, of The Absolute Return Podcast. I am your host Julian Klymochko.

Michael Kesslering: And I am Michael Kesslering.

Julian Klymochko:  It is a lovely Friday June 28, 2019.  Heading into the Canadian long weekend with Monday being Canada Day obviously next week is going to be fairly slow July 4th Independence Day. Also my birthday which is important. The Americans getting extra-long weekend next weekend, which should be nice. Nonetheless, a lot of big news to chat about this week largely on the M&A front. A lot of merger and acquisition activity this past week that we found really interesting and it’s going to be the focus of the podcast this week.

    • Off the top AbbVie to buy Allergan in a huge blockbuster 83 billion dollar pharmaceutical deal. We are going to talk about the strategic rationale behind that merger.
    • An additional activist took a stake in Hudson’s Bay as the as the shareholders continue to push for a higher deal price. What is next?
    • Transat accepted its friendly 520 million dollar takeover from Air Canada at thirteen bucks a share but the stock continues to trade above that price, so what’s going on there?
    • Gaming deal Eldorado Resorts to acquire Caesars Entertainment in seventeen point three billion dollar deal. I am calling this one the minnow swallows the whale. We are going to chat about what exactly is happening on that deal?
    • And we are going to top it off with a discussion of the blog post this week entitled stocks with the hot hand discussion of investing with operating momentum.

Huge deal in the pharmaceutical space with AbbVie making a play for Allergan in a friendly eighty three billion dollar acquisition. What happened? AbbVie agreed to acquire Botox maker Allergan an 83 billion dollar cash and stock deal. This blockbuster deal once closed would result in the combined company becoming the fifth largest pharmaceutical company worldwide. So really creating a pharma leader in the space, fairly large premium for Allergan shareholders 45 percent although their stock has really suffered over the past number of years which we will get into. AbbVie shareholders not too happy with it with their stock down 15 percent on the news. Deal expected to close in 2020 and after that AbbVie and Allergan shareholders are expected to own 83 percent and 17 percent of the combined company respectively.

Some history on Allergan. Here it was once really, a stock market darling by led by CEO Brent Saunders but they recently had a fall from grace. Since about 2016, this was effectively the sale of AbbVie, which is a massive discount at 83 billion dollars that is roughly like less than half what they agreed to sell to Pfizer in 2015 and that deal was ultimately blocked by the government in 2016.

Some history on Allergan. The appeal of Allergan it was basically a leader in treatments for aesthetics or big leader in aesthetics including Botox which is their top selling product and Juvederm and other products such as that. It had a lot of appeal there; I have always viewed it in terms of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Some people are very vain and have an aesthetics right at the top above everything else so Botox and other aesthetic treatments are always viewed as a very stable durable growing revenue line for the company and so it had pretty significant appeal to numerous acquirers over the year.

How Allergan came into play and into existence effectively back in 2014 when Valeant Pharmaceuticals was a big player in the space. They actually teamed up with activist investor Bill Ackman from Pershing Square, a hedge fund to make a play for Allergan, which back then was much smaller and largely, was a maker of Botox and other aesthetic treatments. From that deal, a company called Activists, which at the time was led by Brent Saunders. They came in as a white knight or the friendly acquire to take control of Allergan out of their hands Valiant and Bill Ackman. You know what happened to Valiant? They effectively crashed and burned after that deal’s so Allergan really like lucky to get out of that one. After the deal with Activists and Allergan closed. They changed the name back to Allergan and they did what is called an inversion. They are based out of Europe to get out of the U.S tax laws and continued to be run by Brent Saunders who ran a strategy of consolidation in the pharmaceutical space. Did a ton of pharmaceutical deals over the years including Warner Chilcott. This Allergan deal just really went on a deal spree which Wall Street like for a number of years until they kind of hit the wall in 2015. Struck a friendly deal to be acquired by Pfizer, which was an attractive deal for shareholders.

We were along that merger arbitrage situation which unfortunately was blocked by the government who created a brand new rule look to block this tax inversion. I mean this deal was structured where Pfizer tried to buy Allergan to become an offshore entity to get outside of the purview of the U.S. IRS tax authorities. Unfortunately, that deal was blocked. If it had not been I looked at it and that Pfizer bid was actually worth almost five hundred dollars per share compared to this AbbVie deal at one hundred and eighty five. So certainly much worse result, however shareholders kind of getting rescued here a bit with a forty five percent premium which I’m sure some of them are happy with. Other than that, they are not the best result for Allergan shareholders. The stock really has pretty much gotten more than cut in half since 2015- 2016. It really peaked with that Pfizer deal and after that fell apart, they just suffered along with the rest of the space on increased competition more regulatory scrutiny a lot of products coming off patent. I know their second largest product Restasis is now off patent facing significant competition. But nonetheless this is the deal 83 billion in Allergan shareholders pockets and debt holders. AbbVie looking to become the fifth largest pharma company in the world. What are your thoughts on this transaction here?

Michael Kesslering: Yes, so it actually had two other hedge fund managers that were involved. There was Seth Klarman from Baupost Group. He had acquired his stake at about a 208-dollar cost basis, and so he will lose money on this deal, the other being David Tepper. Tepper had gotten involved in Q1 of this year his cost basis around 160 dollars so he will make a little bit of money on this deal. He was really pushing for a sale of the company since early 2019. Focus on corporate governance in particular splitting the CEO and chairman duties. That was interesting and Seth Klarman his initial stake in the in the company came about through a risk arb position with that aforementioned Pfizer deal. Overall looking at the strategic rationale really just a hedge against the patent expiry of Humira as you would mentioned before, and really there are some synergies but those you can’t really trust those sometimes but yeah relatively well product overlap as well.

Julian Klymochko: Interesting strategic rationale as you said with Humira, their rheumatoid arthritis treatment that actually rang up nineteen point one billion in sales last year and that’s like a majority of AbbVie thirty two point eight billion in revenue last year. That is going to lead a massive hole in their income statement once it comes off patent protection in 2023. The strategic rationale for AbbVie here, really trying to fill that hole in their revenue line over the next few years. Humira being the best selling pharmaceutical worldwide. This deal marks AbbVie foray into the medical aesthetics business by adding four billion in revenue, from products such as Botox, which everyone know. Juvederm fillers, CoolSculpting, aloederm. This medical aesthetics market is viewed as very durable, very consistent profitable growth. Shareholders are pretty excited about that, It’s expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate double digits ten point six percent from ten point three billion in 2013 to twenty five point six billion in a number of years in the future. Nonetheless, AbbVie shareholders not too happy about this cash and stock deal at a 45 percent premium. AbbVie shares down 15 percent on the news but unfortunately, AbbVie shareholders get no vote on this. Unfortunately, all they can do is sell the stock but a decent outcome for Allergan shareholders.

Michael Kesslering: One thing that will be interesting to follow is as you had mentioned that this is basically Allergan being re-domiciled back into the U.S. Do you see this as a trend that will continue forward?

Julian Klymochko: Yeah, It is a reverse inversion of the transactions that Obama was battling say six to eight years ago. A lot of U.S. pharmaceutical companies domiciled offshore to escape U.S. taxation of their international profits. Lot of pharmaceutical companies inverted, say to Ireland or other offshore tax havens such as that. What Obama and his Treasury Secretary at the time believe it was Jacob Lew. They created these new rules to really crack down on inversions, which in my opinion was really the wrong way to go about it. You look at what Donald Trump did, and he just made the U.S. a much more attractive place to do business by lowering tax rates and what do you see. Well it just really sets right incentive for formerly inverted companies to come back to the US because now ironically it is much more attractive to be a U.S. entity than an offshore entity. That is what Allergan ends up doing on this AbbVie buy and ultimately a smart move by doing the reverse inversion and becoming a U.S. entity once again.

Michael Kesslering: Something I can see that both political parties will take credit for.

Julian Klymochko: That’s for sure. Continuing, on with the Hudson’s Bay drama. The HBC take private by its chairman Richard Baker and a number of related parties looking to take that company off the market at nine forty five per share taking out minority shareholders. Well what happened was a second activist investor this time Canadian firm Catalyst Capital recently acquired a stake in Hudson’s Bay. They did not say how much but they did announce that they did buy it from Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, which recently divested of their entire, I believe was a 10 percent stake in Hudson’s Bay at nine forty five per share. Effectively the takeover offer from Richard Baker teachers exiting at that price to a number of various shareholders which included not just Catalyst Capital, a Canadian activist investor, but there’s also rumours that U.S. activist Land & buildings who has been very vocal on this. They actually increased their stake by buying a piece of teacher’s divested stake. A spokesperson for Catalyst stated that the 9.45 offer quote “undervalues the company’s real estate and the potential for a turnaround at its department stores.”

Catalyst joins a list of institutional investors and analysts opposed to selling HBC at that price that Mr. Baker and related entities are offering. Those entities include both WeWork, Rhone Capital. Last week activist Land & Buildings Investment Management they slammed Baker’s bid as quote, “woefully inadequate.” They are asking the company to explore all strategic alternatives including as you noted last week on our podcast to get them to hire an independent investment bank and really shot the company tried to maximize value for minority shareholders here. Jonathan Litt, the founder of Land & Buildings, he said in a letter to the HBC special committee that the offer should be raised to at least eighteen dollars per share almost double the current offer. Now to remind you HBC went public in 2012 at seventeen bucks a share. They were saying that just their real estate was worth north of 30 per share and now they’re offering nine forty five although 18 per share that ask seems quite high versus the nine forty five offer and the six dollar and change unaffected price prior to the offer being announced. You look in the context of HBC historical price. In addition to its net asset value pegged well north of 30 dollars per share, it does not seem that out of this world.

Quote from a CIBC analyst Mark Petrie here, they said in report that HBC owns iconic properties and quote. “With a proven retail business under competent leadership we believe this is not an adequately reflected in the 9.45 offer in our opinion a range of 10 dollars and 25 cents to eleven twenty five per share would be more appropriately reflect today’s value.” There you have it, not only activist investors against it. Institutional investors but also even the street and some analysts pushing for a higher price as well which we think ultimately will happen. I believe that the stock is still trading quite a bit well through the terms. I think it is certainly above nine forty five as the market expects a higher offer here. What are your thoughts on this situation?

Michael Kesslering: Yeah, going back to the aforementioned Teacher’s stake that was sold. I believe The Globe and Mail reported that between Catalyst and Land & buildings, they took up much of that 10 percent. Whether that means 6 or 7 percent that leaves a little bit to interpretation. Even still Land & Buildings already was rumoured to have about 3 percent. That might bring them up to about 10 percent, combined between the two of them, which still leaves a substantial amount convince. That they will need to do for the rest of the vote, which by all accounts should be a fairly easy thesis of that they are just not getting proper value at this nine dollars and forty five dollar per cent bid.

Julian Klymochko: Right, especially with the media starting to pick it up. I mean most people invested in HBC not because it is a retailer but largely because it is a real estate play and it is just unfortunate. The CIBC analyst really nailed it here saying that they need to be under competent leadership. They really need real estate specialization because I mean this is a real estate company. It is not a retailer; they really need to kind of wind down the retail operations over time and capitalize on that tremendous value within the real estate.

Michael Kesslering: Which was interesting in that Catalyst, they had mentioned one of the things that they spoke about was having HBC use technology more effectively to capture market share. I am not sure, if that is just something that they added in or if that would be part of their plan moving forward. As you mentioned like the best scenario here is just to crystallize the value of the real estate.

Julian Klymochko: Right, exactly and you look at the bid at nine forty five versus the now say it’s between 30 to 40 dollars per share and the CEO just stated that the real estate was worth 28 bucks per share last year. This nine forty five bid is implying that the retail side of the business is worth almost negative 20 dollars per share or more than that. What does that tell you? Well perhaps you should wind that down and look to try to liquidate the company and capitalize on that real estate value, because in my opinion, it is a real estate company and the goal of the chairman and the board of directors especially the independent directors, the special committee here is really to maximize value for all stakeholders, which includes minority investors. Hopefully they take that into account. Hopefully they do in fact hire an independent investment bank and get the highest price for minority shareholders here.

Another M&A deal in Canada that we have been talking about it for quite a while as it went through the process. Prior, Transat and Air Canada were in exclusive discussions while those ended with a friendly deal for Air Canada to acquire transact at the initial 13 dollars per share. That equates to five hundred and twenty million in a nice triple digit premium over the unaffected I believe six dollars and change price for Transat. This official deal may be a disappointment for Transat shareholders, as they were hoping for a higher bid from either Air Canada from this process or potential interloper Group Mach, who recently floated an unsolicited 14-dollar cash per share offer.

Montreal-based Air Canada pursued Transat to boost its leisure travel business against the backdrop of a potential turnaround at rival WestJet under new owner. As we previously discussed WestJet struck a friendly deal to be acquired by leveraged buyout operator private equity firm Onex Corp. Transat stock surged more than 34 percent since its exclusivity talks with Air Canada began in May. It actually closed above fourteen dollars per share as investors anticipated a sweeter deal, prior to this subsequent news coming out. Once it came out the shares did drop about seven point four percent back to thirteen dollars and 33 cents per share, which happens to be through the terms of thirteen dollars the bid that is currently put on the table. Certainly, shareholders speculating, the market speculating, that there perhaps is more to come here. Perhaps an interloper will come over the top with a higher offer.

Quote here from Transat CEO. He called the agreement quote, “The best option for all our stakeholders.” He said it would expand the Montreal based company and that is something that is really important to the Quebec government. They really did not want to see Transat fall into the hands of a foreign entity. Or even they are sensitive to it being owned by a non-Quebec based entity, and they are happy with Air Canada coming and acquiring them here, because Air Canada is based in Montreal and they are just looking to build up that head office and not get rid of it.

However, Canada’s commissioner of competition is expected to examine the takeover very closely given that the two airlines have a combined 60 percent of cross Atlantic travel from Canada. That is their market share 60 percent and 45 percent market share on some Caribbean routes. Certainly, a lot of combined market share which will be a huge concern on the Competition Bureau as they evaluate this deal and of course, this deal needs approval from the Competition Bureau in order to close. As for the price, still a number of top shareholders are expected to vote against this deal. I have heard some pushing for 15 dollars per share or higher. One shareholder in fact the largest shareholder at 17 percent is Letko, Brosseau and they stated publicly that they do oppose this deal. What are your thoughts on this situation here with a number of shareholders coming out against and a potential interloper hanging out in the background, a lot going on?

Michael Kesslering: We actually have two potential interlopers. Although one is a little bit more credible being Group Mach but the other being FNC Capital, there another Montreal-based investor that said that they were working to produce an offer in the 17 to 20 dollar range but I don’t really know how seriously that can be taken as nothing has come to the table yet. In terms of Group MOK, going back to prior to the definitive agreement being signed with Air Canada. On Tuesday, they said that they were waving the financing conditions that they had on their proposal after securing a non-binding agreement from the Quebec government presumably to provide that 120 million dollars of financing that the previous proposal was conditional on, but they were removing that. Coming to some sort of agreement with the Quebec government, now after the agreement was signed. Group MOK did come out with a statement expressing their disappointment. Basically expressing their disappointment saying that they don’t believe that the thirteen dollars a share provides adequate value to the Transat shareholders. Basically reiterating their fourteen dollars a share not bumping or anything like that. As you mentioned with the share price currently trading through the Air Canada deal terms. The market does believe that there is some validity to Group Mach proposal. Obviously, the Transat board did not think so. It will be really interesting to follow how this plays out.

Julian Klymochko: Right and you really hit the nail on the head here. You need to take into account, Air Transat board. What are they thinking here? Because clearly Group Mach was vocal in the market saying, okay fourteen dollars per share. We are removing the financing condition yet the Transat Board still continued to go with the 13 dollar offer from Air Canada which not only is lower but present substantial potential competition issues in terms of getting approval and that’s why they do have a fairly large reverse break fee. You think about that and perhaps you know you have to think why Transat board went this route. I have always been quite sceptical on Group MOK potential offer and clearly, the Transat Board is as well. While Mach did waive their financing agreement, their agreement with the provincial government is confidential and they would not provide any details but they said the agreement was non-binding and that is all we know. It is a relatively unknown potential acquire and you don’t know exactly where their money is coming from, and it is in the hundreds of millions of dollars in financing which is a good chunk of change. It is not too easy to source that, they did state that they did not have an agreement with the FDQ or Cassie de depot, which are two large Quebec, based pension plans. I continue to stick with my advice of being cautious on this potential overbuild and the speculation behind it. I think that it could have some financing issues and perhaps that is why the Transat Board did not go ahead and evaluate fully or choose to go with this 14 dollar. This higher 14 dollars per share offer and instead went through the initial Air Canada 13 dollars per share bid.

Big deal in the gaming space with Eldorado Resorts agreeing to acquire rival Caesars Entertainment. In a friendly, seventeen point three billion-dollar merger. Some noted activist involvement with our favourite activist investor Carl Icahn taking a stake in Caesars, a number of months ago pushing for a three board seats, which he got. He then went ahead and pushed Caesars to be sold which ended up coming to fruition. Big win for Carl Icahn there, Caesars shares rallying eleven point four percent on the news while Eldorado shares falling by thirteen point two percent on the news. Clearly Eldorado shareholders not really liking the deal too much, which is surprising because Eldorado as a truly exceptional record of acquiring and really consolidating the gaming space. They have made a series of acquisitions over the past few years including a one point eighty five billion dollar deal for Icahn-backed Tropicana entertainment. Icahn involved there, that was in 2018 just last year and a one point seven billion dollar deal for Isle of Capri Casinos in 2017. I should note since Eldorado went public five years ago, their stock is up 10x so tenfold over the past five years. Excellent track record of success, but shareholders not necessarily liking this deal. What are your thoughts on this consolidation in the gaming space?

Michael Kesslering: Back to Carl Icahn’s involvement. He became involved around March where he took three board seats and installed a new, CEO Anthony Rodeo. The interesting aspect of the new CEO that he installed was that this was the same CEO that he had at Tropicana Entertainment, which was acquired by Eldorado as well. There is an interesting dynamic there, but the other interesting dynamic is that the hits actually earned something very uncommon from Carl Icahn was post announcement. He actually provided a lot of praise to the Caesars board for being rational accepting the right deal which you know Carl has his usual involvement with board members is quite aggressive, very much sharp elbowed.

Julian Klymochko: Right and I did read his letter praising the Caesar’s board and he certainly took his time at the microphone to rebuke other public board of directors, which he always tends to always entertaining.

Michael Kesslering: Absolutely, the other interesting aspect from the side of frequent Vegas travellers is that part of Eldorado success has been their ability to reduce guest inducements. Things such as free drinks and hotel stays, so that has been a big factor in their cost cutting. For anybody that is looking to stay at Caesars after Eldorado takes control. Is that these will likely be reduced there as well as part of their operational enhancements and some of the synergies.

Julian Klymochko: Right and that has really led to their tremendous stock market performance. As I said 10 fold rise in the price of Eldorado shares over the past 10 years due to some of those operational efficiencies improvements cost cutting. That they are able to do within this consolidation strategy. These guys really know what they’re doing and the stock price performance really prove that aside from the one day negative performance declining thirteen point two percent on announcement of this deal. One reason why I find this transaction so interesting is I called it the minnow swallowing the whale. Now Eldorado is worth seven point five billion but Caesar’s they are acquiring for seventeen point three billion in equity and debt. Caesars is nearly two and a half times larger than Eldorado, which is very rare. Whenever you see M&A, mergers and acquisitions, you see an acquiror taking over a target that tends to be quite a bit smaller. It is very rare to see an acquiror taking over target that is two and a half times their size. As I said minnow swallowing a whale, it certainly adds to the risk level. Traditionally Eldorado deals were quite a bit smaller including one point eighty five billion dollar deal last year for Tropicana and prior to that at one point seven billion dollar deal for a Capri casinos this one tenfold that size. I guess we shall see what they can do with it.

Put out a good blog post this week called Stocks with the hot hand investing with operating momentum. By hot hand, it is a phenomenon that occurs when a person who experiences a successful attempt has a greater chance or positive momentum in further successful attempts.

This is often spoken about in basketball where you have a shooter who keeps nailing threes keeps nailing jumpers, nothing but net and they just keep getting subsequent baskets and they seem to have a hot hand, so they get the ball to him and he keeps just sinking them. Like he has that momentum. Well there is a stock equivalent, capital markets equivalent that we call operating momentum. Now there is a couple of ways that we like to quantitatively measure operating momentum. The first one being consensus EPS revisions. What this refers to is the change over time in the consensus earnings per share estimate for a company. We monitor how those average earnings per share estimates for either quarterly or annual performance at a company. How that EPS estimate changes over time, if it’s going up that’s positive operating momentum and if it’s going down then that’s negative operating momentum and we rank all stocks on this operating momentum.

The second methodology for measuring operating momentum. We call earnings abnormal returns. Now this refers to the abnormal share price performance after the release of quarterly results. The classic beat and raise, which means a company beats expectations, exceeds where analysts forecast their results are going to come in and then the raise part is where they increase guidance for future financial performance. That beat and raise is obviously positive. It is usually accompanied by a positive share price result. We refer to that as positive earnings abnormal returns. On the other hand, conversely if a company misses expectations and guides lower God help you if you hold the stock because it’s likely getting crushed. On that news, certainly, investors do not like when companies miss their guidance. They come in below analyst expectations and they reduce their future guidance. The stock tends to decline quite markedly when that happens and the other thing is when a company effectively has a hot hand if they are beat and raise then they tend or on average are likely to do that in the future than say if they miss and guide lower than that momentum tends to continue.

Wanted to get into some numbers. What we did is we ran a simulation, 20 year simulation,  rebalanced on a monthly basis on both Canadian and U.S. stocks on both of these operating momentum factors. The first being Consensus EPS Revisions. We ran a portfolio of the top decile, the top 10 percent of the highest increase in Consensus EPS Revisions. Over the past 20 years and that portfolio rebalanced on a monthly basis, returned 10 percent annualized which is a pretty exceptional return. What is even more interesting is the bottom decile the bottom 10 percent with the lowest EPS Revisions or the most negative Consensus EPS revisions. Actually lost six point two percent per year, so over that 20 years you would have lost 75 percent of your money. However, in the long portfolio that went 10 percent per year of the consensus highest consensus EPS Revisions would have risen six fold. In the U.S., the number is not as extreme but the top 10 percent rising four point two percent and the bottom 10 percent of operating momentum companies based on declining consensus EPS revisions declined 4.5 percent. Still pretty massive spread between the top and bottom decile or Alpha. If you were to run a long short portfolio almost a 9 percent annual spread between them. Now looking at the earnings Abnormal Returns factor. Really exceptional numbers here, top decile over the past 20 years in Canada. Returning a twelve point six percent annually and in the U.S. ten point two percent annually while the bottom 10 percent both lost money over the past 20 years, which is pretty significant.

I wanted to know not just the pretty exceptional performance on the long side on average beating the S&P 500 and TSX composite on average all four of them except one being consensus EPS revisions in the U.S. I wanted to note that what is truly exceptionally here is the performance of the bottom decile portfolios, which all lost money over 20 years which is pretty difficult to do and investors can really capitalize on this. If you are an enterprising investor, you can utilize that within your portfolios to short sell these securities to generate substantial alpha or outperformance.

This is a key insight that a lot of factor investors, smart beta investors, tend to miss because those investors really are long-only and this example operating momentum shows that a lot of the alpha or outperformance of factor investing inherent to stocks is really on the short side. So really, take that into account if you hold a stock with negative operating momentum or if its in their portfolio perhaps look to sell it. If it’s not perhaps look to short it or at the very least do not go long that stock and the top operating momentum stocks could be a good addition to long portfolios.

That is it for Episode 20 of The Absolute Return Podcast. Hope you enjoyed it; we will be back next week. If you want to hear more there is always a lot of episodes available at absolutereturnpodcast.com. If you like it please leave us a review and we will chat with you next week. Cheers.

Thanks for tuning in to the Absolute Return Podcast. This episode was brought to you by accelerate financial technologies. Accelerate, because performance matters. Find out more at www.AccelerateShares.com. The views expressed in this podcast to the personal views of the participants and do not reflect the views of Accelerate. No aspect of this podcast constitutes investment legal or tax advice. Opinions expressed in this podcast should not be viewed as a recommendation or solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any securities or investment strategies. The information and opinions in this podcast are based on current market conditions and may fluctuate and change in the future. No representation or warranty expressed or implied is made on behalf of Accelerate as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this podcast. Accelerate does not accept any liability for any direct indirect or consequential loss or damage suffered by any person as a result relying on all or any part of this podcast and any liability is expressly disclaimed.